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THE ERODING FORCE OF THE INVESTIGATORY
STOP UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
Each increment in the state's ability to intrude into the lives
of citizens is in fundamental conflict with continued individual freedom.
Increased social controls narrow the limits of individual action and
are accomplished only at the expense of individual freedom. While
people appear interested in creating a safe and orderly society, people
nevertheless do not want to forfeit their individual rights. Nowhere
is this more obvious than in the practical conflict between crime
prevention, and personal liberty and privacy.
To combat crime, society requires more police power and more
order, with less regard for personal liberty and privacy. On the other
hand, the preservation of individual freedom requires less police in-
terference and greater emphasis on personal liberty and privacy. It
is obvious that society must balance; that society cannot abolish the
police and other law enforcement agencies in an effort to preserve
individual rights and liberties without signalling the demise of that
ordered society. Nor can society impose so many restrictions upon
the police that they will become practically powerless to prevent crime
and apprehend criminals.
An important aspect of crime prevention is the ability of the
police to stop persons who are reasonably suspected of being enaged
in, or about to engage in, criminal activity.1 This practice, which has
been labelled "stop and frisk,"2 is not new to our society? It is an
1. Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detain and Frisk, 3 CRIM. L.
BULL. 597, 602 (1967).
2. "Stop and frisk" is a phrase used to describe police procedures for de-
taining reasonably suspicious persons and allows for a pat-down, of the suspect's outer
clothing, for weapons if the officer has reason to fear for his safety. This practice
was officially recognized as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 11968).
3. The police power to detain and question is as old as the common law of
England. "Early case holdings and statutes empowered the nightwatch of each town
to detain 'suspicious nightwalkers' until the morning at which time the watchman would
either release or arrest the suspect...." Comment Stop and Frisk: An Historical
Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRiM. C. & P.S. 532 (1967), citing HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 88, 97 (Wilson ed. 1800) and 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 164, 173
(7th ed. 1795).
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accepted procedure for an officer to stop a suspicious-looking person
for questioning and to search that person for weapons if the officer
has reason to fear for his safety. However, because of the intrusive
nature of the stop, an orderly yet free society demands definite
guidelines for police and citizens. These definite guidelines make it
possible for courts to regulate those officers who exceed the bounds
of proper police conduct and infringe on individual rights.
Guidelines for stop and frisk proceedings were established by
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.' The Court, balancing personal
liberty and privacy interests with crime prevention concerns, deter-
mined that a stop must not only be brief' but also predicated on
"reasonable suspicion."' These strictures were accepted and faithully
adhered to-until recently. The United States Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Summers7 held that a search warrant8 implicitly carries
with it the authority to detain occupants of the premises for the length
of the search. Although the Court began its reasoning by citing Terry
and applicable stop and frisk rationale, the Court soon parted ways
and justified Summer's detention although it was unsupported by
Terry's reasonable suspicion standard.' The Court's new balance be-
tween freedom and order is a drastic change from the balance struck
in Terry. Summers all but eliminates Terry's reasonable suspicion re-
quirement, while extending the briefness requirement of a valid stop.
Yet, both of these are requisite elements of a valid stop. This new
balance not only violates established stop and frisk law, but is incon-
sistent with established search warrant law.
The right to detain occupants has never been implicit in a search
warrant. Search warrants are directed towards property rights and
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. The language in Terry emphasizes that a stop should be brief. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26, 33, 34.
6. "Reasonable suspicion is usually defined as reasonable, articulable grounds
for suspecting that a crime was committed and that the person detained was involved.
An officer cannot engage in a stop and frisk whenever he has a hunch that the suspect
is engaged in criminal activity. If the officer wants to stop and frisk a suspect, the
officer must have "specific facts from which [he] can reasonably infer" that the in-
dividual is engaged in criminal activity. Good faith and inarticulate hunches are not
enough for even the temporary detention of a stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
158 (1972).
7. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
8. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued by a magistrate, directed
to a sheriff, authorizing the sheriff to search for and seize any property that con-
stitutes evidence of a crime, contraband, or the fruits of a crime.
9. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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not towards personages."l A search warrant which does not mention
or describe a particular person provides probable cause only to search
the premises but generates no probable cause to detain or arrest the
occupant." The right to detain a person must be based on either prob-
able cause to arrest 2 or on reasonable suspicion as in the Terry
context."3 Neither of these are found in Summers. Thus the Summers'
balance of freedom and order is an entirely different balance from
that reached under Terry or established search warrant law. The ques-
tions arise whether Summers is actually governed by Terry, as the
Court implies, and whether it should be. The immediate concern is
two-fold: whether the Summers' decision will foster the potential abuse
of a stop 4 that Terry sought to eliminate, and whether probable cause
as an element in a search warrant no longer has legal significance.
The drafters of the Constitution were aware of the conflict be-
tween crime prevention and individual freedom. The fourth amend-
ment was born of their efforts to balance these seemingly diametric
values. This note will discuss the fourth amendment's requirement
of probable cause before an officer can intrude into a citizen's privacy.
Second, it will show the Court's recognition of the investigatory stop
as an exception to the probable cause requirement. Third, the note
will discuss the fourth amendment's requirements for a search war-
rant. And last, the note will discuss the effect of the Supreme Court
decision in Michigan v. Summers on the fourth amendment's
established balance of order and freedom. The note will conclude that
the Summers detention should not be permitted since the decision
is a drastic change from established investigatory stop and search
warrant law. If, however, the Supreme Court feels compelled to allow
such a detention, the citizen should be afforded maximum protection
of his rights by limiting the length of the detention.
10. The warrant provisions relate, not to the person, but to the property.
A warrant may be obtained for a search of specific property without showing that
the owner is necessarily suspected of criminal activity. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 555-59 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978).
11. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), where "the search warrant, issued
upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search
"Greg," it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional protection
possessed individually by the tavern's customers." Id. at 92. See also infra note 110.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
14. Terry sought to eliminate the unnecessary intrusions upon personal liberty,
privacy, and autonomy, brought about by dragnet stops, stops based on mere hunches,
and "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
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THE REQUIREMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The Framers of the Constitution balanced the opposing interests
of freedom and order by establishing a standard which allowed
reasonable crime prevention techniques without sacrificing significant
personal freedom. The result was the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution with its standard of "probable cause."'" This
amendment was enacted to prevent the intrusions associated with the
use of general warrants" and writs of assistance." While the amend-
ment did much to preclude the use of such general warrants and writs,
it has been criticized for the vagueness of the phrase "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 8 Unfortunately, the Constitution does not
define "unreasonable searches" and, in our methodology, there is no
adequate test to provide such a determination. To ascertain the nature
of the activities contemplated by the fourth amendment under the
term "unreasonable searches and seizures," it is necessary to review
the controversies on the subject.
Prior to the amendment the colonies followed the English prac-
tice of "issuing writs of assistance to revenue officers and empower-
ing them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled
goods."'9 The writs were valid anytime of the day or night and for
any premises, whether it was a home or a business.0 Since the ex-
ecution of the writ was in the discretion of the officer, he had virtu-
ally unlimited power over all persons and places. The potential for
15. The fourth amendment, ratified in 1791, states that:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
"Probable cause" is the existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a person
of reasonable caution to believe that a crime has been committed. State v. Kolb, 239
N.W.2d 815, 817 (N.D. 1976).
16. General warrants were issued by the Secretary of State, without naming
the person, for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of books and
papers that might to used to convict their owner of the charge of libel. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1885).
17. Writs of assistance authorized the search for smuggled goods or goods
on which the duties were not paid, and allowed entry in order to search any suspected
vaults, cellars, or warehouses for such goods. Id. at 623, 625.
18. "It is quite extraordinary that in a country which prides itself on individual
liberty these should be so obscure and ill-defined." Devlin, The Police in a Changing
Society, 57 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 123, 128 (March 1966).
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1885).
20. See supra notes 16 and 17.
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abuse was great and such potential was realized in many instances.2'
The fourth amendment was written in light of this history and pro-
hibits such discretionary and unreasonable searches and seizures by
demanding probable cause before the issuance of any warrant. The
fundamental core of the fourth amendment is the protection of in-
dividual liberty and privacy from arbitrary and unreasonable police
intrusion."
Difficulty inevitably arises in distinguishing between reasonable
and unreasonable intrusions. The recurring question of reasonableness
must find its resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case.
One obvious intrusion into liberty and privacy is the intrusion of an
arrest. A number of courts define "unreasonableness" on the basis
of the strict technicalities of arrest law. Since arrests must be based
upon reasonable grounds that the suspect committed the crime, the
"reasonableness" of the arrest is determined by the "reasonableness"
of the grounds for the arrest. If the suspect is arrested on probable
cause, the arrest is valid and the fourth amendment is not violated.
However, if the suspect is arrested without probable cause, the ar-
rest is illegal and constitutionally "unreasonable."
This seemingly obvious maxim offered by arrest law was upset
by the Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutionality of in-
vestigatory stops.24 "Unreasonableness" could no longer be defined
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1885), "[Wilkes] . . . was the
pioneer in the contest which resulted in the abolition of some grevious abuses . . .
• Prominent and principal among these [abuses] was the practice of issuing general
warrants .... " Id.
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969). "Nothing is more clear than the Fourth Amendment was meant
to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether
these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions'."
23. See United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. The first case in which the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the con-
cept of stop and frisk was Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prior to Terry, the Supreme
Court had not considered the validity of temporary detentions based on a suspicion
of less than probable cause. However, the issue had been posed and the groundwork
established earlier when the Court, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)
(Burton J., concurring), said:
It is only by alertness to proper occasions for prompt inquiries and
investigation that effective prevention of crime and enforcement of law
is possible. Government agents are commissioned to represent the interests
of the public in enforcement of the law and this requires affirmative ac-
tion not only when there is reasonable ground for arrest or probable cause
for a search but when there is reasonable ground for an investigation.
Id. at 179. The Supreme Court restated the same idea, after Terry, when they said:
The fourth amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the
Holwerda: The Eroding Force of the Investigatory Stop Under Fourth Amedment
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
476 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
strictly on arrest law. Instead of two categories, innocent police
contact25 and arrests, there are now three categories -contact, stop,
and arrest. Instead of one clear dividing line between mere contact
and arrests, there are now two hazy ones: one separating mere con-
tact from an investigatory stop and the other separating the in-
vestigatory stop from the traditional arrest. The question immediately
arises as to where the investigatory stop fits into the fourth
amendment.
A few attorneys have argued that the fourth amendment does
not apply to simple investigatory stops.26 The argument is based on
the premise that investigatory stops are only minor intrusions on the
suspect's rights of privacy and autonomy. These attorneys argue that
since this police conduct does not attain the level of a technical ar-
rest or a fully developed search, fourth amendment principles are not
applicable. But, this argument attempts to alter the balance between
freedom and order already established by the Constitution. Conse-
quently, the argument fails for two reasons. First, the fourth amend-
ment uses the word "seizure" and does not restrict its application
to technical arrests only.27 The Supreme Court significantly noted that
"[it must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an in-
dividual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person and the fourth amendment governs such actions."2 Thus, the
fourth amendment cannot be viewed solely as a limitation on "arrest"
law. The fourth amendment applies any time the individual is detained
and is not limited to the instances of actual formal arrest.
Second, to argue that the fourth amendment does not apply to
simple investigatory stops is to misconceive the purposes of the fourth
precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply
shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.
On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good
police work to adopt an intermediate response.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 135 (1972).
25. "There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from
addressing questions to anyone on the streets." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White,
J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969), where the attorney's
argument can be inferred from the Court's language: "[T]o argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply to the investigatory stage is to fundamentally misconceive the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
27. The fourth amendment does not use the word "arrest" at all. Instead,
it uses the word "seizure", which is much broader than "arrest". Thus, a "stop" can
fall within the ambits of the fourth amendment.
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16.
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amendment.' It is clear that the fourth amendment was meant to pre-
vent unwarranted intrusions upon the privacy and liberty of citizens,
whether these intrusions are called arrests or investigatory stops."
Terry explicitly rejected the idea that the fourth amendment is inap-
plicable and not a limitation upon police conduct when that conduct
stopped short of a technical arrest.3" Terry held that when a suspect
is detained, he is "seized"32 and the fourth amendment becomes
operative. With the recognition of Terry's new "middle ground", the
Supreme Court established a new balance between order and freedom.
This new middle ground expanded the police power to detain suspects,
yet it protected individual privacy interests by imposing fourth amend-
ment safeguards.
The fourth amendment applies to all seizures, including seizures
that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.3 But,
the fourth amendment does not prohibit all seizures. It only prohibits
unreasonable ones. The controlling standard for detentions then
becomes one of reasonableness.' The courts should, therefore, em-
phasize the reasonableness of the search and seizure, instead of the
strict technicalities of arrest law. Since both Terry and Summers in-
volve detentions short of traditional arrest, they must both be bound
by this standard. If courts follow this practice, it will be easier to
develop workable rules for the guidance of police officers-both in
the application and in court interpretations of those rules.
INVESTIGATORY STOPS
Recognized Elements of a Valid Stop
Despite the fourth amendment's explicit requirement of probable
cause to protect against unreasonable seizures," the investigatory stop
is a recognized exception to the probable cause requirement. The in-
29. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 726.
30. Id. at 726-27.
31. The Supreme Court in Terry rejected the "inapplicability of the fourth
amendment" idea, when they said, "We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth
Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the
officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or 'full-blown search'." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
32. The Court stated that, "... whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 16.
33. See generally, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969).
34. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1983]
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vestigatory stop permits the officer to "briefly detain"3 an individual
and make inquiries37 if the officer reasonably suspects that the in-
dividual is engaged in, or about to engage in, some form of illegal
activity. Thus, a stop occurs whenever an officer uses authority to
compel a person to halt or to stay in a certain place. 9 If the person
is under a "reasonable impression" that he is not free to leave the
officer's presence, a "stop" has occurred."0
Once a stop has occurred, the officer has an immediate interest
in assuring himself that the person stopped is not armed.4 If the of-
ficer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and presently
dangerous, he is entitled to "frisk" the suspect."2 A frisk is a care-
fully limited search of the outer clothing of the suspect in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer.3 An
authorized frisk includes only a search for a dangerous weapon and
"by no means [includes] a search for contraband."" As discussed later,"
it is in this regard that the Summers decision could radically extend
the principles established in Terry. A Terry frisk is limited to a
weapon search while Summers could reasonably lead to a search for
contraband.
The practice of "stop and frisk" was not recognized or adopted
by the Supreme Court until its decision in Terry." In this decision
the Court emphasized that the right to seize a person for questioning
or any other purpose, absent probable cause for arrest, is a very
36. "Briefly" means a limited duration, only long enough to ask a few perti-
nent questions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
37. Officer may demand of the suspect his name, address, and an explanation
of his actions. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 35-3-1-1 (Burns 1979), ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
38, S 107-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980), WIs. STAT. ANN. S 968-24 (West 1971).
38. In Terry, the Court expressly declined to decide whether facts not amount-
ing to probable cause could justify an "investigatory seizure" short of an arrest, but
approved a limited stop and inquiry. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
39. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978) (quoting Washington Metropolitan Police Department regulations).
40. Id.
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23.
42. Id. at 23-24.
43. See id. at 39-30.
44. Id. at 16 n.12.
45. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
46. "Stop and frisk", however, was not devised by the Supreme Court in Terry.
Both at the common law, referring to the statutory and case law background of England
and the American Colonies, and under decisional laws of various states, the police
have possessed a clear, but narrowly defined, power to stop and question a suspect.
United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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limited one. There are three criteria which must be satisfied in order
to justify this limited right to stop or seize a person. First, the stop
must be based on a "reasonable suspicion"47 that the detained person
had committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Second, the stop must
be brief." Third, the questions must be limited to obtaining informa-
tion relating to the detained person's conduct."9
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion criteria of a valid stop,5 ° the
officer must reasonably suspect that a crime has been committed and
the detained individual is involved in the criminal activity. This is
an objective standard. The facts must be such that a "reasonable"
person would entertain such a suspicion. The Terry Court stated that
a less stringent standard would result in intrusions upon constitution-
ally guaranteed rights." If police stop and frisk an individual, they
must have specific facts from which they can reasonably infer that
the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, every officer
who conducts a stop must be prepared to cite those specific facts which
led him to believe that the stop was justified.52
This objective standard eliminates inarticulate hunches and good
faith suspicions as legitimate bases for a stop. Such hunches and
suspicions would not be enough to convince the reasonable man that
a stop would be appropriate. Thus the objective standard would not
be satisfied. It is for this reason that Summers is such an affront to
constitutional principles. Summers abandons Terry's objective stan-
47. See supra note 6.
48. Case law is virtually unanimous in requiring that stops be "brief;" however,
case law is also unanimous in not saying what "brief' means. MODEL RULES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT: STOP AND FRISK, Rule 301 and comment (Police Foundation 1974).
49. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 53.
51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
The rights of liberty, privacy, and the right to move freely about without undue
unfluence is a natural right of all U.S. citizens. These rights are guaranteed to all
citizens under the Constitution.
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21. "[I1n justifying the particular intrusion, the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. See
also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
53. A "reasonable suspicion" is a "quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce
an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal
activity is at hand." "Mere suspicion" is the "apprehension of criminal activity without
proof or upon slight evidence." "Good faith suspicion" is an honest belief that criminal
activity is at hand, but is a "concept of (one's) own mind and inner spirit and, therefore,
may not be conclusively determined by (one's) protestations alone." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 623, 1138, 1298 (5th ed. 1979).
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dard when it detains the occupants of the premises. The decision to
stop is seemingly left entirely to the whim of the police officer with
its concomitant potential for fostering the unconstitutional intrusions
anticipated in Terry.' Detention of citizens based on hunches and
without reasonable suspicion is diametrically opposed to the constitu-
tional rights of personal privacy, liberty, and freedom of movement.5
To combat this, the Supreme Court in Terry fixed the standard at
a "reasonable suspicion" that a criminal had been or is about to be
committed.
While the standard of "reasonable suspicion" involves more than
inarticulate hunches and suspicions, it entails less than the arrest stan-
dard of "reasonable cause to believe."5 If the "reasonable suspicion"
of a stop and the "reasonable cause to believe" of an arrest were de-
fined the same way, an arrest could always be made under traditional
arrest law and there would be no need for a procedure allowing brief
detentions for investigation based on a lesser standard. It is true that
both standards require a balancing of the public interest in crime
prevention and the individual interest in privacy, liberty and freedom
of movement.57 Yet, a brief on-the-street seizure requires a lower stan-
dard of suspicion than a formal arrest, since the former is shorter
and less conspicuous than a full arrest, as well as less humiliating
to the person.' But the objective reasonable man standard remains.
54. See supra notes 14 and 51.
55. Freedom of movement is the "right of a citizen to move freely about
without any undue restraint or interference by law enforcement agencies." Comment,
Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
532, 534 (1967). See also supra note 51.
56. An arrest must be based on reasonable cause for believing that a crime
was committed. A stop is based on a reasonable cause for suspecting that a crime
was committed. Note, Criminal Procedure: Police Power to Stop, Question and Frisk
Suspicious Persons, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 105, 108 (1967).
57. "[Tlhe requirement of probable cause is a compromise for accomodating
the opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and detection, and of individuals
in privacy and security. The same compromise is not called for it all situations, and
thus this balancing process should take account of precisely what lies in the balance
of a given case. Because one variable is the degree of imposition on the individual,
it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to meet the probable cause test
when the consequences for the individual are less serious." LaFave, "Street Encounters"
and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. ,54 (1968-69)
[Hereinafter LaFave, "Street Encounters"].
58. Compared to a traditional arrest, an investigatory stop is for a shorter
period of time, less damaging to one's reputation,'less conspicous and less humiliating,
and not recorded as an arrest. LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An
Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 358-59. But see PAULSEN, THE
PROBLEM OF POLICE INTERROGATION, 28 (A.L.I. 1961). Arguably, the fact that a deten-
[Vol. 17
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In any stop situation, the facts still must support a reasonable possibil-
ity that the detained person has committed or is about to commit
a crime. Summers attempts to circumvent this inquiry by justifying
the detention solely on the basis of a search warrant. But, a search
warrant only looks at the location of contraband, and not the person
who put it there. 9 Unfortunately for Summers, every such constitu-
tional balancing of privacy rights must confront the issue of
"reasonable suspicion." There can be no exceptions.
The second criterion for a valid detention is that the investigatory
stop be "brief." While case law is virtually unanimous in requiring
that stops be brief, case law is also unanimous in not saying what
"brief" means.6" A few states have set statutory temporal limits on
the extent of detentions 1 but most have not. Without a statutory in-
terpretation of "brief," courts are forced to consider other factors.
The most commonly used factor is whether the questioning during
the stop was limited to inquiries designed to allay the suspicions and
fears of the officer."2 Consequently, the briefness of the stop is analyzed
in terms of the limited scope of the questioning.
The length and scope of the questioning during a stop must be
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible."63 In other words, the officer is authorized
to investigate only the facts which gave rise to the suspicion.64 He
may ask the suspect to give his name, address, and a satisfactory
tion may be limited to a few hours or may not result in a criminal record "is irrele-
vant to the goal of achieving freedom to go about and do what one pleases, subject
to interruption only upon reasonable cause."
59. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 48.
61. Only five states have set definite time limits on the duration of a stop.
These limits range from thirty minutes to four hours. See, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
S 1902 (1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. S 46-5-402(4) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. S 171.123
(1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 594.2 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (1956). Approx-
imately fifteen other states have adopted stop and frisk statutes, but the duration
set is either "temporarily" or "reasonable." See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 35-3-1-1 (Burns
1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 S 107-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The remainder, and by far
the majority, of the states have remained silent on the subject.
62. The officer may question or frisk a suspect regarding weapons if the of-
ficer has reason to fear for his safety. See supra note 2.
63. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19, citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
64. For example, if a police officer sees a jaywalker, the jaywalker can be
detained and questioned concerning his conduct. However, without additional suspicious
facts, the officer cannot justifiably detain the suspect while checking for other unrelated
warrants. The officer is authorized to investigate only the facts which gave rise to
the suspicion.
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explanation of his actions.' Once that information is obtained the stop
is over. In the circumstances of Summers, this should mean that the
occupants should only be questioned about their presence at the search
warrant site. The occupants should not be detained longer than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish such questioning." This question-
ing is not intended to elicit a confession but only to obtain informa-
tion relating to the detained person's conduct. Since the detention
is justified by a reasonable suspicion concerning the suspect's con-
duct, the justification for the stop ceases once this suspicion has been
allayed.
On the other hand, if the cursory questioning does not dismiss
the officer's suspicion," a more thorough investigation is authorized.68
65. Name, address, and an explanation of the suspicious actions are the most
acceptable and widely-used basis for on-the-street investigatory questioning. It has
also been held that a brief stop of a suspicious individual to determine identification
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information may be
most reasonable. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). If the suspect pro-
vides unsatisfactory answers to legitimate police inquiries, the officer is usually allowed
more time for questioning. See e.g., The Uniform Arrest Act, reprinted in Warner,
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA L. REV. 315, 343-47 (1942). This Act provides for
questioning up to two hours if the suspect answers unsatisfactorily.
66. The questions must be aimed at information relating to the suspect's
suspicious conduct and toward allaying the officer's suspicion concerning such con-
duct. See supra note 37.
67. Examples which would authorize further investigation include:
1) If the suspect gives an account of himself which adds to the prior suspicion
and this presents the officer with a situation in which he may make a lawful arrest;
2) If the responses are inconsistent with the prior knowledge of the officer;
3) If the responses are internally inconsistent;
4) If the responses are inherently incredible; or,
5) If the responses are inconsistent with observable facts.
LaFave, 'Street Encounters", supra note 57, at 93 n.276.
68. A more thorough investigation may include a longer questioning period.
See e.g., infra note 72 and accompanying text. A more thorough investigation may
also include more intensive questioning provided such questioning is related to the
suspicious conduct, and perhaps even questioning at the station.
No cases have been found that sanction questioning at the station under a
stop proceeding. In fact, most cases discourage it since such questioning can readily
assume the characteristics of a formal arrest. However, the courts have recognized
the propriety of moving a suspect for convenience or safety. See e.g., United States
v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974) (stopped on an airport runway). People v.
Courtney, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 90 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1970) (an angry crowd gathered
at the scene). A two hour detention on a street corner could be inconvenient as well
as uncomfortable. There seems to be sufficient grounds for inferring that the suspect
could be taken to a nearby station for convenience in questioning. However, the question-
ing still must retain "stop" qualities and cannot adopt the characteristics of a formal
arrest.
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In Terry a further intrusion was allowed after Terry's "mumbled
response to the officer."69 In United States v. Richards,"0 a further
detention was justified following unsatisfactory responses to the of-
ficer's inquiries. Also, the Uniform Arrest Act 7' allows detention and
further questioning for as long as two hours if the suspect provides
unsatisfactory answers to officer inquiries.72 The statutes simply give
an officer more time to elicit a response should the suspect render
evasive answers. This is certainly necessary since the stop has no
protective value if police are required to abandon any further ques-
tioning simply because the suspect will not cooperate.
It should be emphasized, however, that the statutory provisions
do not mandate a response from the suspect. States with detention
statutes do not provide "penalties" for refusing to answer. Rather,
the statutes are directives to the detaining officer. " The majority
view is that refusal to answer furnishes no basis for arrest.7 ' The
refusal is merely one factor the officer will consider, along with the
evidence which gave rise to the initial suspicion, in determining
whether there are grounds for arrest.75 Thus, in Summers, had Sum-
mers failed to cooperate, the police would have been justified in a
prolonged detention. However, Summers was cooperative. To be con-
69. 392 U.S. at 7. When the man "mumbled something" in response to his
inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing.
Id. "We cannot say his decision . . . to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons
was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination . . . ; the record evidences the
tempered act of a policeman who ... had to make a quick decision as to how to pro-
tect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so." Id. at 28.
70. 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974).
71. The Uniform Arrest Act was proposed by the Interstate Crime Commis-
sion in 1942. Three states have adopted the Act, at least in part: Deleware, Rhode
Island, and New Hampshire. The Act is reprinted in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942).
72. Two hours is a rather long time to stand on the street and question a
suspect. It is feasible that any such further questioning may take place in the squad
car or at the police station, provided the detention does not assume "arrest-like"
qualities. See supra note 68.
73. The officer may use a refusal to answer as grounds for further detention
and questioning. In a majority of jurisdictions, refusal to answer may even be a factor
adding to probable cause for arrest. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
74. LaFave, "Street Encounters", supra note 57, at 106-107. See also MODEL
RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: STOP AND FRISK Rule 304 (Police Foundation, 1974). It
should be noted that there is a split of authority. The majority allows refusal to answer
to be considered with other factors as an element adding to probable cause. A strong
minority, however, contends that refusal to answer may not be considered as an ele-
ment of probable cause to arrest; it is cause for further investigation of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the stop.
75. See supra note 73, and authority cited therein.
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sistent with Terry, such cooperation cannot justify a subsequent pro-
longed detention.
Along with prolonged detentions, citizens should realize that the
authority to stop necessarily carries with it the authority to use force
against an uncooperative suspect. While most citizens abhor the use
of force because of its obvious potential for excess, without such
authority, the officer does not have the necessary means to accomplish
the purpose for the stop. Yet, there are a number of safeguards to
prevent flagrant police abuse. Authorized force is strictly confined
to the act of detaining the suspect. There is no justification for or
recognition of force to elicit a response. The authorized amount of
force is only enough "reasonable force""6 to detain the suspect but
not enough to cause serious bodily harm to the person stopped."
An officer may not stop anyone unless the officer is prepared
to explain, with particularity, his reason for doing so."8 The stopping
and searching of a person is not authorized merely because he has
a criminal record. 9 The stopping and searching of a person is not
authorized merely because he is in the vicinity of a crime;' this must
76. Most policy manuals have set guidelines on the use of force.
An officer may use only such force as is reasonably necessary to
carry out the authority granted by these Rules. The amount of force used
to effect a stop shall not, however, be such that it could cause death or
serious bodily harm to the person stopped. An officer must not use a
weapon or baton to effect a stop. He may use his hands, legs, arms, feet
or handcuffs.
MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: STOP AND FRISK, supra note 74, Rule 305(b).
If a person resists or runs, reasonable force may be used to hold him .
• . . Never use deadly force or force that may cause serious harm. The
guideline is this: Where the clear need arises, hands, legs, feet, and hand-
cuffs may be used. The use of guns, clubs, club substitutes, or mace is
not allowed.
Id. at Rule 305 Commentary at 49 (quoting Cambridge Police Department Operations
Procedures and Policies IV(D)(2), (3).
If a suspect refuses to stop, the officer may use reasonable force,
but only by use of his body, arms, and legs.
Id. (quoting New York City Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials Policy
Statement I(B)(1).)
77. See supra note 76.
78. See supra note 52.
79. In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), FBI agents were investigating
a theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey. Henry was stopped because he was
observed picking up cartons at a residence and because he was "suspected of some
implication in some interstate shipments . . . ." Id. at 103. The Court held that the
suspect's reputation will not justify a stop when all of the suspect's acts are outwardly
innocent. "The fact that packages have been stolen does not make every man who
carries a package subject to arrest." Id. at 104.
80. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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be reinforced in Summers since Summers apparently authorizes deten-
tions of persons who are merely on the premises. The questioning
must proceed in the immediate area in which the stop took place."
Finally, the detention is authorized to last only long enough to ask
those limited questions sanctioned by a statute or the common law.8
The recognition of investigatory stops has not undermined the
balance of freedom and order established in the fourth amendment.
It is true, the Supreme Court's balance in Terry was established to
promote greater crime prevention techniques. But, this standard did
not sacrifice freedom for the increased police power. The Supreme
Court preserved the same level of personal privacy by maintaining
the precise protective safeguards expressed in the fourth amendment.'
Lingering Opposition to the Propriety of Investigatory Stops
The United States Supreme Court decided that the fourth amend-
ment's balance embodied in the investigatory stop was constitution-
ally permissible. Yet, arguments opposing the necessity and propriety
of such stops continue to exist. The speculation is that the need for
field interrogation and detention would disappear if we had more and
better trained police officers." However, a larger police force, by itself,
would not be a significant deterrent to crime. Although the visibility
of patrolmen is a deterrent to crime,85 it would require a ubiquitous
police force to prevent crime to the degree that stops are no longer
necessary, and such is a physical and economic impossibility. The
81. During a valid stop, movement of the suspect within the general vicinity
is permissible without converting the temporary seizure into an arrest. This power,
however, is not unlimited. It must be effectuated by the exigencies of the situation.
United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974) (stopped on an airport run-
way). People v. Courtney, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 90 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1970) (an angry
crowd gathered at the scene).
82. See supra note 37.
83. The Supreme Court stated that a less stringent standard than reasonable
suspicion would result in intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed. rights, One can
reasonably infer from this statement that the reasonable suspicion standard preserves
such constitutionally guaranteed rights. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22.
84. Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?,
in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Sowle ed. 1962). The speculation is that
in police work, as elsewhere, one generally gets no more than he pays for and that
legislation of police power is a wholly inadequate substitute for responsible police fiscal
and personnel policy. The chief disadvantages of field interrogition and detention are
that they cost money and require the exercise of political and administrative statesman-
ship whereas enacting new arrest laws offers the illusion of doing something about
crime without financial or political complications and has a natural appeal to political
expendiency. Id. at 33.
85. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 433, 452 (1967).
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Supreme Court's reasoning in allowing the investigatory stops as a
valid technique for intercepting reasonably suspicious persons is sound.
It is a socially cogent policy to prevent crime rather than attempting
to compensate crime's incalculable consequences."
The second argument against stops is the harassing effect these
"intrusions" have on the minorities.' Minorities and slum residents
are said to be the main victims of stop proceedings.8 Arguments
stressing this harassment factor emphasize the extensive loss of per-
sonal liberty and privacy and conclude that the stop rarely should
be allowed.8
Theoretically, this harassment argument poses very little threat
to the continued existence of the stop. There are too many counter-
vailing safeguards that justify the stop. The requirement of reasonable
suspicion, not just mere suspicion, restricts the possibility of harass-
ment. The necessity of preventing crime in inner city high crime areas
combats the harassment argument. Furthermore, the relatively minor
intrusion imposed on the suspect when a stop occurs also offsets the
harassment argument. Theoretically, the safeguards and necessities
promoted by these three justifications override the harassment fac-
tor. In reality, however, harassment can still occur. The fear of harass-
ment is valid and cannot be eliminated by alleged departmental
safeguards. The problem of harassment, though, is not in the stop
per se; it is in the individual police officers. Such officers will con-
tinue their harassing activities regardless of the stringency of the
laws.' But, an effective law enforcement tool should not be completely
86. It is virtually impossible to "compensate" the victim of a crime. One can-
not be compensated for indelible scars on emotions, personality, dignity, or self-esteem.
Monetary values cannot adequately replace the intangibles lost pursuant to a murder,
robbery, or rape. Similarly, imprisoning the culprit may superficially soothe the victim's
longing for revenge, but it does not restore the victim to his pre-crime position. For
these reasons, crime prevention should be preferred as opposed to post-crime
compensation.
87. A Michigan State survey found that both minority groups and persons
sympathetic to minority groups throughout the country were almost unanimous in
labelling field interrogation as a principle problem in police-community relations. "The
evidence is weighty and uncontradicted that stop and frisk power is employed by police
most frequently against the inhabitants of our inner cities, racial minorities and the
underprivileged." Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 597, 605 (1967) (quoting an amici brief to the United States Supreme
Court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Traditional civil suits against police officers are largely ineffective for two
reasons. One is the difficulty of satisfying a judgment in a substantial amount against
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prohibited simply because it is subject to potential abuse. The fact
that stop laws may incidentally foster minority harassment is no
reason to prohibit an otherwise necessary and effective law enforce-
ment tool.
A final argument is that stop and frisk laws violate the fifth
amendment due process clause,91 because of vagueness. The assertion
is that the lack of definite guidelines provides no ascertainable stan-
dards for determining the boundaries of proper or improper conduct.2
There is an obvious example of this in Summers. The Court uses the
word "occupant" but does not state whether it means residents only,
or residents and visitors." One would have good grounds to argue
that such vagueness renders stop and frisk laws violative of due pro-
cess, and therefore should be eliminated. However, the alternative
is to return to traditional arrest law with its probable cause stan-
dard. While the probable cause standard may be more familiar to the
courts, it can hardly be considered more definite since both tests use
objective standards. Moreover, the use of objective standards does
not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. Courts have historically
been guided by objective standards. 5 While stop and frisk statutes
do not list the specific questions to be asked or state a specific time
a relatively impecunious policeman; the other is that the individual subjected to police
misconduct either has not suffered any actual damage or else the damages suffered
are so speculative as to be extremely difficult to prove.
As regards remedial action by discipliniary measures directed at the offending
officer, this seems quite unrealistic if the officer actually obtains incriminating evidence,
even though his conduct was illegal. Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interroga-
tion, 58 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 465, 491 (1967).
91. That amendment reads in pertinent part, "Nor shall any person ... by
deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. The assertion is that the standards are vague because of the indefinite
length of time for a stop, the failure to mention the amount of allowable force, and
the vague definitions of "temporary questioning" and "reasonable suspicion".
93. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
94. Both tests deal with probabilities. An arrest is reasonable grounds to
believe a crime was committed, while a stop is based on reasonable grounds to suspect
that a crime was committed. Therefore, it is arguable that the difference may not
be one of kind, but rather in the degree of probability required.
95. "To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional
requirements it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of
the acts or conduct prohibited." People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 748 (1939),
92 P.2d 1039, 1042.
A statute providing that aliens may be deported for failure to furnish notifica-
tion of address unless such failure is reasonably excusable provides sufficiently definite
standards and is no so vague as to be unconstitutional. Czapkowski v. Holland, 220
F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1955) (per curium), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955).
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limitation for a stop, the terms of the statutes are sufficiently de-
fined to satisfy the due process clause. 6
The previous arguments have advocated the elimination of stop
and frisk proceedings entirely. Were such arguments accepted by the
courts, Summers could not have been detained unless the police had
come with an arrest warrant. Yet at the opposite extreme is the argu-
ment that more crimes would be solved if all persons were subject
to unrestricted police authority to stop and frisk. 7 While this may
be true, such power is obviously incompatible with a free and open
society. It should be sufficient to say that in a free society, the
arguments for unrestricted police authority could never override the
concepts of privacy, liberty, autonomy, and human dignity.
The right to stop .and question suspects is an essential law en-
forcement tool. Without the procedure, the police are limited to ar-
resting for probable cause or not stopping the suspect at all. 8 But,
the fourth amendment does not require the police to either arrest
the suspect or let the suspect go free. On the contrary, it may be
"the essence of good police work"99 to utilize an intermediate step-
the investigatory stop.
In justifying this intermediate position, the Court has properly
considered fundamental fourth amendment concerns. The fourth
amendment requires a showing of probable cause- a proper balance
of the opposing interests of crime prevention and personal privacy.
Because of the insignificant intrusion upon personal privacy, the
Supreme Court decided the investigatory stop is consistent with the
96. Comment, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 539-40 (1967).
97. This general, simple truism may be valid on it face. But, the implications
on personal liberty, privacy, and dignity are so horrendous that such authority could
never be legitimated for the purpose of effecutating more criminal convictions.
98. Because of the importance of crime prevention in our crime-infested society,
the inability to detain based on reasonable suspicion would eventually expand the prob-
able cause concept to include these borderline cases. This would "widen the power
of the police to visit upon persons the consequences of arrest when such should not
be done. Thus the constitutional standard of probable cause prior to an arrest ...
will be diluted to the point that situations warranting only [an investigatory] stop
will be considered an arrest." United States v. Thomas, 250 F.Supp. 771, 796 (1966).
See also LaFave, Detention for Investigation, WASH. U.L.Q. 367-73 (1962).
99. "The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the
precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary,
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate
response." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 23).
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fourth amendment's balance of order and freedom. An investigatory
stop, as limited as it may be, is the only recognized exception to the
probable cause requirement that can justify a detention on less than
probable cause. 00 The fourth amendment requires that any other ac-
tions which interfere with personal privacy and liberty must satisfy
the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause.
FOURTH AMENDMENT PREREQUISITES FOR SEARCH WARRANTS
Police searches are an obvious interference with personal privacy
and liberty. Thus the fourth amendment commands that search war-
rants only be issued upon probable cause and with a particular descrip-
tion of the place to be searched and the things to be seized.0 1 Since
search warrants only authorize the search of places and the seizure
of things, they may be issued to search any property, whether or not
such property is occupied.' ° Moreover, search warrants need not name
the person from whom the things will be seized.103 The Summers deci-
sion hinges on the search warrant and the stop. The Court held that
a search warrant carries with it the authority to detain the occupants
of the premises during the search. °4 Yet, the objective of "searching"
is to search for and seize the specific property named in the warrant,
without invading other privacy rights of those persons involved. This
is why Summers is such a constitutional shock. Under this traditional
rationale, people had constitutional privacy rights despite the search.
100. Other probable cause exceptions include consent searches, administrative
searches and searches incident to arrest; but these exceptions generally do not entail
detentions. If, however, a detention occurs, it is justified by the detainee's consent
or by the concurrent arrest, not by the probable cause exception, per se.
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
102. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978). In Zurcher, nine
policemen were injured by demonstrators at Stanford University Hospital. Two days
later the Stanford Daily carried articles and photos devoted to the demonstration and
attack. The photos by a staff member indicated that the had been located where he
could have photographed the assailants. A warrant was obtained to search the Daily's
offices for negatives, film and pictures relevant to identification of the assailants. The
Court upheld the warrant.
103. In most cases, search warrants are directed at the premises, to find
"evidence" of crime. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 n.15 (1974). However,
it is possible that if criminal activity is continuing from one location, a search warrant
for the premises may also include a search of a specific person on the premises, as
long as there is probable cause to believe that he might have evidence on his person.
See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (a search warrant for narcotics authorized
the search of the "Aurora Tap Tavern" and the bartender, "Greg").
104. "[Wle hold that a warrant to search for contraband . . . carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search
is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
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Summers apparently removes such rights of liberty, privacy and
freedom of movement. Since, however, the execution of a search war-
rant invades the privacy of persons legally presumed innocent, the
Constitution unequivacably requires the showing of probable cause
before the issuance of any warrant.
Warrants are only issued upon probable cause that the specific
things sought to be seized are located on the property. Although con-
ceptually simple, the practical execution of warrants is replete with
pitfalls for the unwary police officer. The progression from initial ap-
plication for the warrant to completion of the search is filled with
numerous but important details.0 5 The aspects of the search warrant
that are pertinent here relate to the need for a particular description
of the things to be seized, the the propriety of detaining and search-
ing persons found on the premises. These aspects are critical in analyz-
ing the propriety of the Summers decision.
The fourth amendment requirement of a particular description
of the things to be seized is intended to prevent general searches1"'
and thus protect personal privacy in the home. Particularity of descrip-
tion is required so that the executing officer can reasonably ascertain
and identify" 7 the places authorized to be searched and the things
authorized to be seized. Yet, a particular description in a search war-
rant does not entail a rigid, technical accuracy and completeness. The
courts only require the description to be sufficiently definite'08 to
enable the searcher to identify the persons, places, and things author-
ized to be searched and seized. Even such minimal particularity of
description precludes the use of general warrants and arbitrary police
power since little is left to the discretion of the searching officer. The
absence of a "particular description" requirement for search warrants,
105. The aspects of a search warrant that are important, but will not be covered
by this article, are: the need for a neutral and detached magistrate, Connally v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 245 (1977); a particular description of the place to be searched, Steele v. United
States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); the time of execution, United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d
269 (9th Cir. 1970); right to gain entry to the premises, Kerr v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963); and, the general conduct of the officers before, during and after the search.
106. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
107. "It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search war-
rant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended." Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
108. "[A]ffidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted
in a commonsense and realistic fashion .... Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity . . . have no proper place in this area." United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
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or even investigatory stops,' 9 would sanction too much police discre-
tion and justify "fishing expeditions."
Although the warrant adequately describes the premises and the
property to be searched and seized, the police must demonstrate a
separate probable cause to search any person not mentioned in the
warrant, who is found on the premises.1 ' It is unconstitutional to
search persons not connected with the place being searched,'' who
merely happen to be upon the premises"' and who are not named
or described in the search warrant."' Mere presence at the place where
the search warrant is to be executed is not probable cause to search
that person."4 Rather, the law requires probable cause to believe that
109. See supra note 52.
110. See generally, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). A search warrant for
contraband was executed for the premises of a tavern and for the bartender. A cur-
sory search for weapons of all the twelve patrons present was held invalid because
the warrant did not specify probable cause in regards to the customers; and, mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity did not give rise
to probable cause to search that person. See also Wall, Fourth Amendment - Search
of Individuals Pursuant to a Warrant to Search the Premises, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 558
(1980).
111. A search of a person on the premises described in the search warrant
is not authorized "without some showing of a connection with those premises." People
v. Dukes, 48 Ill. App. 3d 237, -, 363 N.E.2d 62, 64 (1977).
112. One case precluding mere presence as basis for a search is United States
v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976). In Miller, police officers with a search warrant
for narcotics, entered the premises and found two women and the defendant in the
kitchen. Defendant requested permission to leave since he did not live there, but he
was detained until narcotics were discovered. The court held that the officers could
detain the defendant, briefly, for the purpose of questioning him with respect to iden-
tification and his reason for being on the premises. If there was no knowledge that
he was there for any unlawful purpose, he was free to leave. The court added, follow-
ing Terry, that the defendant could only be searched if the officers believed that he
was armed and dangerous. See also, State v. Bradbury, 243 A.2d 302 (N.H. 1968). In
Bradbury, a search warrant was issued for a women's dormitory room. Defendant,
a male, was found on the premises when the warrant was executed. The decision was
similar to Miller. The officers were not authorized to search him and the length of
any detention was governed by Terry.
113. See supra note 110.
114. The Supreme Court, in United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), held
that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, does not lose the immunity from
the search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled. At the time of deten-
tion, the police had no information implicating the defendant and no information point-
ing to any possession of contraband. Therefore, the police could not infer participation
from mere presence. Id. at 587, 592-94. "The inference that persons who talk to nar-
cotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort
of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an in-
dividual's personal security." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968).
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the suspect may be concealing on his person at least some of the items
sought."5 This holding is certainly proper. Any broader power to
search persons present at the place to be searched would ignore vital
fourth amendment concerns by tacitly sanctioning the resurgence of
general warrants and arbitrary police power.
When there is no probable cause to search particular individuals
found at the site of the search warrant the police may still detain
those who might be concealing critical evidence."6 As indicated
above," 7 Terry permits the stopping of such persons for investigation
based on reasonable suspicion. The usage of Terry and its progeny
is no longer limited to the strict on-the-street type detention."8 Rather,
the focus is on the requirement of a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is involved in some form of illegal activity. In the case of
a search warrant a reasonable suspicion will justify only a brief stop
of the individual for questioning necessary to resolve the officer's
uncertainty regarding the possible connection of that individual with
the items named in the warrant. However, Terry does not permit a
search for contraband on less than probable cause."9 Individuals found
at the site of the search warrant, who are not named in the warrant,
still maintain the privacy interests guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment. Without probable cause, such an individual does not lose those
privacy rights by mere presence at the site of an executed search
warrant.' 2'
Probable cause to search the premises and the occupants will
justify an invasion of privacy rights for a detention of the occupants
and a search of the house. 2' Reasonable suspicion, on the other hand,
will only justify an invasion of privacy rights for a brief detention
115. The law requires that there be probable cause to believe that such per-
sons are themselves participating in criminal activity or, somewhat more precisely,
that there be probable cause that evidence which might be concealed or destroyed
is to be found upon the person searched. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 144 (1978).
116. Are police powerless to take any steps at all to foreclose the risk of per-
sons departing with critical evidence concealed? United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp.
160 (D. Mass. 1960), and Commonwealth v. Snow, 298 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1973), imply
that they are powerless and suggest prolonged detention as a precautionary measure.
117. See supra notes 6, 47 and accompanying text.
118. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
119. Terry announced that police must have probable cause to search persons
not named in a warrant in all cases, except those where weapons are suspected. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26, 27.
120. See supra notes 110 and 114 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 102, 110 and accompanying text.
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and a search for weapons, if appropriate.'22 Therefore, when police
officers enter a premises with a search warrant for contraband but
without probable cause to search persons found there, as in Summers,
consistency with investigatory stop rationale and search warrant law
requires that such persons may only be detained upon reasonable
suspicion. If reasonable suspicion exists, the detention may last only
long enough to allay the officer's suspicion, just as on-the-street en-
counters. If reasonable suspicion does not exist, the suspects cannot
be detained simply for being in the house and should be free to leave.
THE IMPACT OF MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS ON ESTABLISHED
STOP AND WARRANT DOCTRINES
Because of the constitutional guarantees of liberty, privacy,
and freedom of movement," persons who are not described in a search
warrant and who are not reasonably suspicious in regard to the il-
legal activity should be free to leave the search warrant site. Con-
trary to this rationale, which is the only logical conclusion under
established stop and warrant law, the Supreme Court in Michigan
v. Summers24 held that a search warrant for contraband carries with
it the authority to detain the occupants of the premises for the length
of the search. This decision is ostensibly founded on both investigatory
stop rationale and search warrant law. Summers' initial stop is de-
rived from investigatory stop rationale, that is, an individual in a house
being searched supports enough reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop. The search warrant then establishes the time element by limiting
the detention to the length of the search. However, Summers has far-
reaching ramifications for established principles in both areas. The
decision is inconsistent with both the traditional detention element
of an investigatory stop and the detention and probable cause elements
under a search warrant. Consequently, Summers will radically affect
the established fourth amendment balance of order and freedom.
In Summers, police officers obtained a search warrant and were
preparing to search a house for narcotics when they encountered Sum-
mers descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in gain-
ing entry into the house and then detained him while they searched
the premises. After finding narcotics in the basement, the police ar-
rested Summers. A subsequent search of his person disclosed heroin.
Summers was charged with possession of the heroin found on his per-
122. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 51.
124. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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son. He moved to suppress the evidence as a product of an illegal
search in violation of the fourth amendment. The trial judge's grant-
ing of the motion was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals12
and the Michigan Supreme Court.'26
The United States Supreme Court's subsequent reversal was
based on a line of cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio.2 7 These cases
recognized an exception to the fourth amendment's probable cause
requirement based on the government's interest in crime prevention
and the minimal intrusion on the citizen's privacy.2 8 While all of these
cases are distinctive, they all use the investigatory stop as a starting
point.
Terry was the first case to enunciate the major elements of a
valid investigatory stop." These elements are still the requisite under-
pinnings of current investigatory stop procedures. Yet, the Supreme
Court has subsequently seen fit to expand the scope of the initial in-
vestigatory stop requirements.
The first major investigatory stop case after Terry was Adams
v. Williams." Acting on an informant's tip, a police officer approached
a parked car, reached inside and removed a fully-loaded revolver from
the driver's waistband. The driver was convicted of illegal possession
of the handgun as well as possession of the heroin that was found
during a full search incident to his weapons arrest. 3 ' This decision
expanded the scope of Terry in two respects. First, it approved a
stop based on an unverified tip, in contravention of Terry's require-
ment that the articulable suspicious facts be based on an officer's per-
sonal observation.32 Second, the suspected criminal activity prompting
the stop was a mere possessory offense, as contrasted with the
suspected armed robbery activity in Terry.
The next obvious extension of the investigatory stop emerged
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.' In Brignoni, the Court expressly
extended Terry's stop doctrine to include the stopping of automobiles.
125. 68 Mich. App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689 (1976).
126. 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979).
127. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
128. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1981).
129. See supra text accompanying note 47.
130. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
131. Id. at 144.
132. Terry required "reasonable suspicion" before a "stop". It had been infered
that if the officer is not on the scene, he will not be in a position to develop the
reasonable suspicion.
133. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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Although this added an entirely new field to the investigatory stop,
the Court maintained traditional Terry doctrine by still requiring the
necessary articulable facts from which to infer a reasonable suspicion
of illegality.13 '
Most recently, the Supreme Court has expanded the reasonable
suspicion element of a stop by giving great deference to the "trained
eye."'35 In United States v. Mendenhall,3 ' the Court allowed a stop
primarily on the basis of a drug courier profile.'37 The Court recog-
nized the Drug Enforcement Administration agent's special training
and gave deference to his expertise in ferreting out illegal drug traf-
fic. Thus, the Supreme Court validated the stop as reasonable under
the circumstances without strictly scrutinizing the constitutional ques-
tions presented by the Administration's procedures.
These cases illustrate that the exception for limited intrusions
that may be justified by law enforcement interests has not been con-
fined to the momentary on-the-street detention involved in Terry. The
question, though, is whether these cases justify the intrusion in Sum-
mers. Although a few minor comparisons can be drawn, 38 there is not
a progression of Supreme Court decision that lead to the point where
it is obvious that Summers must be the next step in the progression.
The Supreme Court apparently was not concerned with this
absence of a logical progression because the Court did not decide Sum-
mers on that basis. Instead, the Court relied on the underlying prin-
ciple of minimal intrusion.' The Court stated that Terry and its pro-
134. "[Oifficers on roving patrols may stop vehicles only if they are aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally
in the country." Id. at 884.
135. When someone has been trained to watch for, detect, or notice something
in particular, or has experience in so doing, such that he can perform the task much
better than the average citizen, the person is considered to have a "trained eye."
136. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
137. A "drug courier profile" is an informally compiled abstract of characteristics
thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs.
138. In both Summers and Adams, the suspected criminal activity prompting
the stop was a mere possessory offense. It can be inferred that in Mendenhall and
Summers the Court gave deference to the "trained eye"-the officer's ability to ferret
out illegal drug traffickers. Furthermore, one could argue that the Brignoni car stop
is a logical step between a purely public, on-the-street, Terry-type stop and a purely
private, in-the-home, Summers-type detention.
139. "These cases recognize that some seizures . . . constitute such limited
intrusions on the personal security of those detained ...that they may be made on
less than probable cause .. " Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699.
"Therefore, in order to decide . . . this case . . . it is necessary to examine
• . . the character of the official intrusion .. " Id. at 700-01.
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gency permit an exception to the probable cause requirement if the
resulting intrusion on the citizen's privacy is minimal. The Court
analyzed the facts in Summers and found the detention of the oc-
cupants to be a limited intrusion because it was "surely less intrusive
than the search itself."4 ' The Court concluded that the detention in
Summers fit the exception and therefore could be based on less than
probable cause. Thus the Supreme Court relied on the investigatory
stop rationale regarding the minimalness of the intrusion, and not on
a logical progression of case law, when it held that a warrant to search
for contraband carries with it the limited authority to detain occupants
of the premises while the search is conducted.
An Examination of Summers' Right to Detain in Light of
Prior Stop and Warrant Laws
The Supreme Court decision in Summers appears irreconcilable
with the rationale behind search warrants and investigatory stops.
The Court in Summers extended these concepts beyond previously
recognized limits but did not acknowledge the extensions. Instead,
the Court stated that the decision lies entirely within the bounds of
existing precedent." However, a close analysis reveals major
discrepancies. Terry permitted only brief detentions to allay the of-
ficer's suspicion." Summers permits detentions for the duration of
the search.' Terry authorized detentions based on reasonable
suspicion... while Summers implies that the right to detain can be
based solely on presence or mere proximity.' Under traditional war-
rant law the scope of a search and seizure is justified only by the
140. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. But see Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 767 n.12 (1969). "[W]e see no reason why, simply because some interference
with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, fur-
ther intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that
the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require."
141. The Court reasoned that "[i]n these cases the intrusion on the citizen's
privacy 'was so much less severe' than that involved in a traditional arrest that 'the
opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer's safety'
could support the seizure as reasonable." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 697-98
(quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979)).
142. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
143. "[Wle hold that a warrant to seach for contraband ...carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search
is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
144. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
145. "[A] warrant to search .. .carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
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scope of the underlying warrant;146 yet, Summers justifies the deten-
tion of persons not even mentioned in the underlying warrant. If these
discrepancies are not reconciled or the decision in Summers more
precisely defined, a consistent and predictable application of this new
standard will be impossible.
One of the major conflicts between Terry and Summers is the
duration of the detention. By balancing the crime prevention interest
and the individual privacy interest, the Supreme Court in Terry
decided that stops must be relatively informal, brief, and of limited
intrusion upon the person's privacy. Summers, on the other hand,
allows the occupants to be held for the length of the search. Since
searches have lasted anywhere from fifteen minutes147 to three days,148
a detention during the search of a house has the potential to be for-
mal, long, and a significant intrusion upon a person's privacy. The
potential duration of the search thus threatens the occupant with a
lengthy detention unwarranted in a Terry-type stop.
Assuming such impositions can be overlooked, 49 the Summers
decision is still plagued with unnecessarily vague language. In Terry,
the Court authorized detentions based on reasonable suspicion. But
in Summers the Court held that a search warrant implicitly carries
with it the authority "to detain the occupants of the premises.""i The
word "occupant" is critical to the decision, yet the Court makes no
attempt to define it. In the context of the decision the word occupant
could have two meanings. If occupant is strictly construed to mean
only a tenant or the owner then mere visitors should be allowed to
146. For instance, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that routine searches of rooms other than that in which the arrest oc-
curred are invalid unless conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. "Such searches,
in absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of
the search warrant." Id. at 763. Again, in Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958),
the Court held that a daytime search warrant is ineffective to support a nighttime
search of the premises.
147. United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976) (a search for nar-
cotics was finished in fifteen minutes when narcotics were found in the refrigerator).
148. State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1978) (a three day search of a house
in an effort to find blood stains).
149. From a practical standpoint the impositions may be hard to overlook. If
a warrant is executed as the occupant leaves for work, he will be forced to miss work.
If the warrant is executed at night or on a weekend the occupant will be forced to
forgo meetings and social outings. This is not to suggest that warrants should not
be permitted at these times, just that the accompanying detentions should not be
permitted.
150. See supra note 143.
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leave. But, if visitors may leave, they could take the sought for con-
traband with them. Thus, the argument that occupant detention is
necessary for police safety and to prevent contraband from leaving
the premises' is inconsistent with allowing visitors to leave. The other
alternative is to interpret occupant as meaning anyone present. This
definition however will pose different problems since mere presence
on the scene will not support a prolonged detention of the occupant."'
With no subsequent case law, it is mere conjecture as to which defini-
tion of occupant the Court will ultimately choose.
Regardless of the chosen definition, it is obvious that occupant
is not limited to someone "in" the house. Summers was not in the
house, but rather on the front porch, when the officers arrived. Yet,
he was detained as an occupant during the search. However, it is not
so obvious whether the occupant must be "on" the premises. The Court
stated that officer may detain "occupants of the premises.""' 3 One
wonders whether this means "on" the premises, or whether this phrase
leaves open the inference of reasonable proximity. Theoretically, the
Summers decision should only apply to occupants literally on the
prenises since the basis for the detention is the warrant, and search
warrants must particularly describe the place of the search. But, con-
sider the potential in the following settings: the owner is on the street
in front of his house; the owner is next door talking to neighbors;
there are two tenants, one is leaving the premises to join the second
tenant a block away; and finally, the tenant is at work five miles away.
Most people would agree that the tenant five miles away cannot be
detained. But the other cases raise serious problems. Without definite
guidelines these detentions inevitably are subject to the discretion
of the officer in charge. But Terry does not allow' such arbitrary police
power in the execution of investigatory stops.5 Moreover, Terry does
151. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
152. Presence is not enough to conclude that a person is engaged in criminal
activity, without knowledge specifically linking the detained person to the crime. United
States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948).
If there is a sufficient degree of suspicion to justify a brief seizure of the in-
dividual for investigation, that investigation may resolve the uncertainty in the mind
of the officer concerning the possible connection of that individual with the property
named in the warrant. But, a prolonged and subsequent detention is not valid. United
States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111, 115 (9th Cir. 1972). "No cases have been cited, nor
found by us, which in a stop and frisk situation authorized the holding of a person
for a prolonged period." United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251, 253 (8th Cir. 1976).
153. See supra note 143.
154. One might suggest that Mendenall's "trained eye" theory would allow
police discretion in detaining persons reasonably close to the premises. See supra notes
135-36 and accompanying text. Yet, the problem here is not whether one can pick
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not authorize such a potential for prolonged detentions. Therefore,
Summers is not consistent with the principles set forth in Terry.
But following the Summers' rationale, Summers and Terry should
be consistent. The Court allowed the detention in Summers because
of the Terry decision that probable cause was not required where the
resulting intrusion on individual privacy was minimal. Since both cases
deal with detentions, the resulting intrusion should be similar.
Therefore, Summers should adopt Terry's balance of order and freedom
to insure that the detention is in fact only a minimal intrusion.
However, as just previously mentioned, Summers has not adopted
Terry's balance. Reasonable suspicion is not required, nor is the deten-
tion required to be brief or momentary. Therefore, it is questionable
whether Summers's intrusion is in fact minimal.
While Summers is clearly not consistent with Terry with respect
to the principles of a stop, inquiry is necessary into whether Sum-
mers can be reconciled with prevailing search warrant law."'5 If Sum-
mers authorized the search of individuals under the auspices of a
search warrant, it would obviously set new precedent.5 6 But Sum-
mers does not explicitly authorize a search of the occupants, it only
authorizes a detention-a Terry concept. However, the authorized
detention is beyond the narrow scope of Terry. The Supreme Court
has held that the detention of a citizen beyond the narrow scope of
Terry is reasonable only if supported by probable cause for arrest 7
or "justified by particularized police interests" other than a desire
to initiate criminal proceedings against the detained person.'-
out the occupant or match him to a profile. The problem is whether there are grounds
for detaining him when he is not actually on the search warrant site. The "trained
eye" theory does not answer that question. See also supra note 6.
155. When the Court said, "a warrant to search ... carries with it the limited
authority to detain," see supra note 143, one could reasonably infer that either Terry
or search warrant law was justification for the detention. Thus, Summers should be
reconcilable with one, if not both, justifications.
156. Police must have probable cause to search persons unnamed in a warrant
in all cases except where weapons are suspected. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
"The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the
criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference to support
an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal security." Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968).
When there is no probable cause to believe the occupant was involved in the
crime, there is no right to search that person.
158. The Terry stop was a narrow exception. The officer may question the
suspect and ask him to explain the circumstances, but any further detention must
be based on consent or probable cause. United States v. Chamberlain, 609 F.2d 1318,
1322-23 (9th Cir. 1979), [citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)].
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The Court in Summers conceded the pre-arrest seizure was not
supported by probable cause. 159 However, it justified its decision upon
other legitimate law enforcement interests. Those interests include
having the person present if evidence turns up, facilitating a more
orderly search, preventing frustration of the search, and increasing
officer safety. 6 ' Therefore, to support a prolonged detention, the in-
terests advanced by Summers must exhibit more than the desire to
initiate criminal proceedings against the detained person.
The Supreme Court in Summers listed these four justifications
for the detention of occupants. The first is the "legitimate law en-
forcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating
evidence is found."'6 1 The second is "the orderly completion of the
search may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are
present."'6 2 But these objectives represent nothing more than the or-
dinary police interest in discovering evidence and apprehending
wrongdoers. They are not "particularized police interests" as required
by the Court'63 since they are merely designed to aid in the initiation
of criminal proceedings against the person detained. And without prob-
able cause, as in Summers, the Court requires that detentions can
only be justified by particularized police interests other than the desire
to initiate criminal proceedings against the suspect. Therefore, these
two "legitimate interests" cannot support a valid detention.
The third justification for allowing the detention is the interest
in preventing the suspect from frustrating the search. This argument
is without merit since it is doubtful that persons would attempt to
remove evidence that was not already on their person. With the police
searching the house, these individuals are not likely to risk revealing
the hiding place of the contraband in an attempt to remove it.
Similarly, it is unlikely that an individual would leave the premises
158. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 299 (1973). Street encounters can be in-
itiated for a variety of purposes unrelated to a desire to prosecute crime: weapons
confiscation, control of gangs and juveniles, disturbance control, or traffic control.
LaFave, "Street Encounters", supra note 57, at 61-62.
159. 452 U.S. at 696 (1981).
160. "Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes
of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers."
Id. at 702. "Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the
occupants of the premises are present." Id- at 703.
161. See supra note 160.
162. See supra note 160.
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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to go for "help" and then return to frustrate the search.'G Therefore,
the police interest in preventing the occupants from frustrating the
search might be more readily achieved if the occupants were free to
leave the premises.
The fourth justification for allowing the detention is the interest
in police safety. This is of course a vital interest. Yet, it does not
justify a detention for the duration of the search. Terry permits a
frisk for weapons only if the officer fears for his safety." If the of-
ficer detains the occupant but has no reason to frisk him, the officer
is creating more danger by detaining this possibly armed person in-
side the premises. If there is reasonable suspicion that the occupants
have weapons the officer may frisk the occupants for such weapons.
In these circumstances, it is the frisk and not the detention that pro-
motes the police safety interest. Moreover, if the suspect shows a
willingness to leave, the police have no basis for fear. Such a will-
ingness negates the intention to harm the police or interfere with
the search. Thus, police safety is not a valid justification for allowing
a prolonged detention.
Although the four interests advanced in Summers do not justify
a prolonged detention, the police are not powerless to let the "occu-
pant" walk out the door with incriminating evidence. They can still
employ the investigatory stop. However, the stop does not justify a
search for contraband on the person.'66 The search pursuant to a stop
must be confined in scope to discovering weapons and does not justify
a personal search to prevent the disappearance of evidence."7 A deten-
tion and frisk beyond the narrow scope of Terry is reasonable only
if it is suppported by probable cause to arrest or by particularized
police interests.166
Although the detention was not supported by probable cause to
arrest,' 9 the Court attempted to justify the Summers' decision on two
different grounds. First, the supposed minimalness of the intrusion
allowed a detention based on less than probable cause. Yet, Terry
set forth the guidelines for such an exception and stated that a less
164. If there is no contraband on the premises, there is no need to return
to frustrate the search. If there is contraband on the premises, the "occupant" will
probably not want to return once he is free to leave.
165. See supra note 2.
166. "[A] search ... is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance
or destruction of evidence of crime." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29.
167. See supra note 166.
168. See supra notes 157 and 158 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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stringent standard would result in intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights. 70 Summers however did not follow Terry's
guidelines, 17' but used a less stringent standard than the one set forth
in Terry. This raises legitimate questions as to the constitutionality
of the Summers' "intrusions." Second, the Court offered several police
interests in support of the detention. Yet, these interests do not sup-
port a detention of the occupants. M Therefore, the decision that a
search warrant carries with it the authority to detain suspects is based
on an absence of logic and clear reasoning.
The Constitutionality of the Summers' Detention
The decision in Summers is not justified by investigatory stop
rationale, search warrant law, or any other line of prior case law.
The Supreme Court clearly established new law. The Court should
have explicitly recognized the Summers' detention as new law, without
attempting to bootstrap it to previously accepted principles. Never-
theless, even in absence of such precedence, the essential question
is whether this new law is in fact constitutional.7 3
One problem with the Summers' decision is its use of extremely
broad and vague terms.' Undoubtedly these terms will be narrowed
on a case-by-case basis, but presently these broad terms are of major
concern. For instance, the Court justified the detention of occupants
in order to prevent flight "in the event that incriminating evidence
is found."'7 5 One trusts that the Court was not inferring that a suspect
can be held until probable cause to arrest is discovered. If the police
can detain a person while searching for probable cause to arrest him
the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause has been
materially weakened. The same holds true for search and seizure law.
The scope of a search and seizure is justified only by the scope of
the underlying warrant. 6 If police may seize and detain a person to
facilitate the execution of a warrant that did not authorize his arrest,
the scope of the underlying warrant has been totally ignored. It must
be remembered that detentions, whether they be pre-arrest deten-
tions or detentions during a search, are not validated by what is
discovered later for this is clearly bootstrapping. The detention must
170. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
172. See supra notes 161 through 165 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 51.
174. See supra notes 150 and 152 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 160.
176. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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be valid at the inception of the search.177 If this basic premise is
subverted, the protections afforded by the fourth amendment will be
severely curtailed.
Once the scope of the underlying warrant is ignored or the fourth
amendment suspicion requirement disregarded, people will be seized
and detained for mere presence or proximity to the premises. The
police will no longer have to present a rational nexus between the
person and the suspected contraband-presence on the premises will
be a sufficient nexus. Citizens will be subject to extensive detentions
in the hope that incriminating evidence will be found, thereby per-
mitting the citizens' arrest. In effect, because of their presence, per-
sons found on the premises will be viewed as potential "containers
178
of contraband, and not as personages. Presence will become the
ultimate criterion for a search.
However, treating persons like "containers" is a flagrant depriva-
tion of the fourth amendment protections of personal privacy and
liberty. Until Summers, personal privacy and liberty were protected
by limiting intrusions to the detection of weapons and not the detec-
tion of contraband and other evidence. If individuals are viewed as
containers, such personal rights will necessarily be considered irrele-
vant in respect to prohibiting such personal searches. Thus, Summers'
authorization to seize and detain a person to facilitate the execution
of a warrant will lead to the right to search that person not only
177. In United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), the Court pointed out that:
The Government's last resort in support of the arrest is to reason
from the fruits of the search to the conclusion that the officer's knowledge
at the time gave them grounds for it. We have had frequent occasion
to point out that a search is not made legal by what it turns up. In law
it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its
success.
Id. at 595 (footnote omitted).
178. The Court has generally respected the privacy rights inherent in a con-
tainer. However, the trend is changing. In 1981, the Court decided that containers
in the passenger compartment of an automobile could be searched, New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 950 (1981), but that containers in the trunk could not be, Robbins v. Califor-
nia, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). In 1982, the Court in effect overruled Robbins and held that
any container found in any part of the automobile could be searched, United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. ., 50 U.S.L.W. 4580 (1982). The sanctity of containers has been
destroyed. The scope of the search is no longer defined by the nature of the container
but by the object of the search. The individual's expectation of privacy will not sur-
vive a lawful custodial arrest or a finding of probable cause. One might suspect that
these latest decisions by the Court, including Ross and Summers, reflect the conser-
vative nature of the Court and its willingness to crack down on crime-albeit in a
questionable manner.
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for weapons but also for items named in the warrant. This goes far
beyond recognized fourth amendment doctrine.
A second major problem is that Summers' authorization of a
detention based only on probable cause to search the house obscures
the innate differences between an arrest warrant and a search war-
rant. Probable cause to issue and execute a search warrant is not
probable cause to arrest.'79 Search warrants relate only to property
and "named" persons while arrest warrants relate only to persons."'
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of
the property is suspected of a crime but rather that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for are located
on the property.' Although it appears that the granting of a search
warrant must be supported by the same degree of probable cause
as the granting of an arrest warrant, it is clear that the warrants
themselves are not identical. Summers has taken a significant step
towards eliminating that unmistakable difference by recognizing the
appropriateness of a detention and subsequent arrest under a search
warrant.
The fourth amendment must be the principle guidepost in con-
sidering the propriety and constitutionality of this new development.
The fourth amendment was intended to protect the privacy rights
of the individual by requiring probable cause to search or seize any
person. The merger of arrest warrants and search warrants as in-
itiated by Summers entails a fiction of probable cause. In Summers,
though there was probable cause to search, there was no probable
cause to "seize" the occupants. Such a merger sacrifices individual
personal rights. Yet, these rights are too fundamental to a free soci-
ety to be sacrificed as a result of judicial fiction or for the sake of
mere police convenience and efficiency. When a search warrant is in-
179. Probable cause to search is when
the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched. By comparison, the right of arrest arises only when a crime
is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer or when
the officer has . . . [probable cause] to believe that a felony has been
committed by the person to be arrested. Although it would appear that
the conclusions which justify either arrest or the issuance of a search
warrant must be supported by evidence of the same degree of probity,
it is clear that the conclusions themselves are not identical.
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not.. . Run Smooth",
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 261 (quoting Comment, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
180. See supra notes 10 and 179.
181. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555-59 (1978). See also supra note
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volved, the Court must demand particularity in the application for
the warrant and precision in its execution. The Court must be sure
to limit the resulting intrusion to areas necessary to effectuate the
search. No search should be allowed to intrude upon more than the
proprietary interests of the occupants since that is the extent of a
search warrant. The plethora of privacy rights having little or nothing
to do with proprietary interests mut be protected. Since Summers
invades these non-proprietary privacy interests, the Summers deten-
tion should not be permitted. If, however, the Court feels compelled
to allow such a detention, Summers must be cautiously applied to avoid
the unnecessary relinquishment of personal rights and to promote fun-
damental fourth amendment protections.
THE NECESSITY FOR DEFINITE GUIDELINES
To cautiously apply any law, standard or rule, and to apply it
consistently, there must be definite guidelines. In the case of deten-
tions, definite guidelines which recognize the right to stop and ques-
tion suspects will better protect citizens' rights while limiting the
discretion of police officers.182 Since the Summers decision fosters
potentially long detentions unsupported by probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, definite guidelines should be considered.
There is a continuing debate in many states as to which type
of guidelines is more appropriate for a detention- definite guidelines
or "the reasonable man"-type guidelines. These discussions have fo-
cused on the Terry investigatory stop rather than on the Summers
detention since Summers is an extremely recent decision. Yet, both
situations concern the detention of a suspect. Both situations require
the right to be free from "unreasonable seizures". Both balance the
right to detain suspects for investigation against the suspect's rights
of privacy and liberty. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Summers
justified its detention strictly on the minimalness of the resulting in-
trusion upon the citizen's privacy-an exception explicitly established
in connection with the investigatory stop."u Since the two situations
182. Possibly, the Supreme Court is not the agency to tell the police what
they can or cannot do. A more suitable agency of government for providing the police
with legal guidelines is the legislative branch. They could establish commissions, ap-
point committees, conduct studies, or hold hearings. The legislature has the tools to
promote policy and practicality, unaffected by the shocking facts of an isolated case.
183. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
184. "In the first such case, Terry v. Ohio, the Court recognized the narrow
authority of police officers to . . . make limited intrusions on an individual's personal
security." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 698 (citation omitted).
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are so analogous as regards the actual detention aspect, guidelines
applicable to one should be applicable to the other. As there have
been no discussions concerning guidelines for a Summers' detention,
the discussion concerning investigatory stop guidelines will be analyzed
and applied to Summers.
Five states"s have enacted detention statutes which place definite
limits on the duration of an investigatory detention. These statutes
vary from a maximum detention of thirty minutes," to one of four
hours. 87 Approximately fifteen states have adopted detention statutes
which only require the detention to be "reasonable."'88 The rest of
the states have remained silent on the subject. A few prominent legal
organizations have drafted proposed guidelines for detention statutes."'
In 1942 the Interstate Crime Commission proposed the Uniform Ar-
rest Act. 9 ' It provides for a total period of detention not to exceed
two hours. 9' In 1966, the American Law Institute proposed the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.'92 Under this code, when detain-
ing persons for investigatory stops, the police may hold the suspect
no longer than twenty minutes. 9' These proposals, however, have not
yet been widely accepted. 9 ' But given such a substantial difference
in the set time limits, the question which immediately arises is whether
a twenty minute detention and a two hour detention can both be valid
under the fourth amendment.
185. See supra note 61.
186. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. S 46-5-402(4) (1979) and NEV. REV. STAT.
171.123 (1979).
187. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 594.2 (1974).
188. See supra note 61.
189. The Interstate Crime Commission proposed the Uniform Arrest Act in
1942. In 1966, the American Law Institute proposed the Model Code for Pre-Arraignment
Procedure.
190. The Uniform Arrest Act, reprinted in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343-47 (1942).
191. Id. at 344, Uniform Arrest Act S 1(3).
192. The Uniform Arrest Act and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure both allow the police to stop and question any person when the officer has
reasonable grounds to suspect that such person is committing or has committed a
crime. The Model Code goes one step farther and also allows a stop based upon
reasonable suspicion that such person has knowledge which may be of material aid
to the investigation of a crime. This clause adds significantly to the investigation stage
of police work since it allows for the detention and questioning of potential witnesses.
193. MODEL CODE S 2.02 (1) and (2) (Tentative draft No. 1, 1966), cited in
LaFave, "Street Encounters", supra note 57 at 44-45, n.22
194. The I.C.C. Uniform Arrest Act has been adopted, at least in part, by three
states: See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 SS 1901-12 (1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. SS 594:1-25
(1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 55 12-7-1 through 12-7-13 (1956). The ALI Model Code for
Pre-Arraingment Procedure's suggested time limit of twenty minutes has not been
adopted by any states,
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The propriety of a statutorily prescribed time period is open to
question. A "prescribed time period" is the maximum allotted time
that an officer has to question a suspect concerning the suspicious
circumstances. In a valid Terry stop the time period would run from
the time of the initial contact to a point where the suspect must be
arrested or must be free to leave. In a Summers detention the time
would run from the execution of the warrant to the time when the
occupant would be free to leave the premises. This is true because
the actual detention of the occupants is no more than a "stop" which
takes place in a house rather than on the street. It should be noted
that after the allotted time in Summers, the occupant would be free
to leave but the officers could still continue with a "reasonable" search.
The most common argument opposing a set time period is that
every case is not readily adaptable within one specific time frame.
"A detention does not automatically become 'unreasonable' because
of the passage of time." '95 The argument continues that to be proper,
the investigation must only be carried on with "due diligence."' " A
second and similar argument emphasizes the importance of having
enough time for a thorough investigation. 97 Since a set time period
applies uniformly to all detained persons, a problem arises when a
number of witnesses or suspects are involved. The time period for
dealing with one person may be unreasonably short when there are
many. When this set time period expires, the officer is forced to make
a difficult decision. He can either charge the suspect at the risk of
the suspect being innocent or he can release a possibly guilty person.
The implications are that society has a choice between condemning
the innocent or suffering from the continued atrocities of the uncon-
victed guilty.9 These arguments, when taken together, might per-
suade some people to oppose demands for definite time limits. Yet,
195. LaFave, Detention For Investigation By The Police: An Analysis of Cur-
rent Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 353.
196. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (5th ed. 1979) defines "due diligence" as "a
measure of prudence, activity, and assiduity . . .not measured by any absolute stan-
dard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case." Theoretically, the stan-
dard would appear to be sufficient. Practically, however, the standard is vague enough
to authorize arbitrary police power.
197. Whether referring to a Terry stop or a Summers detention, "investiga-
tion" in this context refers to the questioning of the suspect and not the search of
the premises.
198. This second argument has no real bearing on a Summers detention if the
officers are permitted to search the premises without having to question the detained
occupants. If, however, the detention follows Terry standards as it logically should,
the officers will face the same problem of having to question a number of suspects
within a definite time period.
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when these arguments are closely examined, they reveal the neces-
sity for such definite time limits.
It is true that every case is not readily adaptable to a specific
time frame. But the difference between a definite, prescribed time
standard and an objective standard will not appear in every case. It
is fairly obvious that in a "reasonable" search, the two standards will
be exactly the same up to the point established by the statute. Thus,
there is no need to discuss the detentions that are shorter than the
prescribed time period since the propriety of these detentions is not
affected by the type of time standard used. Instead, the focus of the
discussion should be on the cases that exceed the statutory time limit
since the propriety of these detentions might be affected by the type
of standard in operation.
Critics of the prescribed time period might argue that such a
prescribed period is improper since a detention does not automatic-
ally become "unreasonable" by the passage of time.1" Yet, the pro-
ponents of the set time period do not suggest that a violation of the
time limit automatically renders the stop constitutionally
"unreasonable." Rather, exceeding the time limit automatically renders
the stop violative of state law. In the five states that already have
prescribed detention statutes, it is important to notice that the time
limits themselves are always qualified. The statutes start by
delineating that the detention may only last long enough to obtain
the suspect's identification and to question the suspect concerning the
suspicious circumstances. The statutes then add that in no event is
the duration to exceed the established time limit."'0 The
"unreasonableness" of the detention hinges on the questioning rather
than on the time limit per se. The time limit is only a manifestation
199. Mr. LaFave suggests that under a definite time standard, detentions will
be declared "unreasonable" solely on the basis of the time element. He attempts to
counter this notion by saying a stop "does not automatically become unreasonable
because of the passage . . . of time." LaFave, Detention for Investigation By The Police,
1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 353.
200. See e.g. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. S 46-5-402 (1979):
(2) A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person under this part
may demand of the person his name and address.
(3) A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person . . . shall inform
the person ... that the stop is not an arrest but rather a temporary
detention for investigation, and that upon completion of the investiga-
tion, the person will be released unless he is arrested.
(4) After the authorized purpose of the stop has been accomplished or
30 minutes have elapsed, whichever occurs first, the peace officer shall
allow the person to go unless he has arrested the person.
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of the state's interest in protecting its citizens' rights of privacy,
liberty, and autonomy. It is not the ultimate criterion for determin-
ing "unreasonableness." The state is simply saying that once a deten-
tion exceeds the stated time period there is a stronger interest in
protecting these personal rights than in promoting criminal investiga-
tion. Even though exceeding the set time limit may not be constitu-
tionally unreasonable it is a violation of state law. Consequently,
although a detention exceeds the statutory time limit, it does not
necessarily violate the fourth amendment.
Facts amounting to a violation of the fourth amendment will con-
stitute such a violation in every state -regardless of the applicable
state statute.20 1 In the investigatory stop context, there are only a
few circumstances when the fourth amendment will be violated. If
the stop is not based on reasonable suspicion the stop is "unreason-
able."' If the questioning is not related to the circumstances justify-
ing the initial stop the stop becomes "unreasonable."" 3 Finally, if the
state statute provides an unreasonable length of time for any deten-
tion, the statute and the stop are both "unreasonable."" 4 States may
establish their own time limit standards to further legitimate state
interests, and these standards may be more stringent than those em-
bodied in the fourth amemdment. Yet, such standards are still limited
by the fundamental standards established by the fourth amendment.
While some states have chosen to establish a specific statutory
time period, others have simply designated that the stop can last only
a reasonable time.0 5 The arguments for such an objective, "reasonable
time" standard emphasize the increased crime prevention and detec-
201. In Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1966), the court stated:
If a specified length of time is too long to be federally constitutional, it
cannot make any difference whether the delay occurred in New Hamp-
shire, where the State statute was violated, or in another state where
it was not. In each state, the State courts are, of course, free to attach
whatever effects they choose to violations of this kind. But they are not
free to attribute such judgments to the requirements of the Constitution
of the United States unless an equivalent judgment would be constitu-
tionally compelled in every other state on the same set of facts, no mat-
ter what periods were set by the State statute.
Id. at 253.
202. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
203. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 201.
205. See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38 S 107-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980), "A peace of-
ficer ...may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time ..
. and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of his ac-
tions." (emphasis added).
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tion made available by the objective standard. While such interests
are undoubtedly legitimate, the arguments totally disregard the cor-
responding privacy interests of the individual. The objective standard
creates a problem of arbitrariness - a definitional problem of what is
"reasonable." One hour might be reasonable if the stop is carried on
with due diligence."6 The question then arises whether three hours
would be reasonable.0 7 Five hours?0 8 Three days?0 9 Theoretically,
under an objective standard, a stop could last forever, as long as it
was continued with due diligence. The importance of a specific time
standard then becomes obvious. Even though "due diligence" is an
objective standard it requires the officer's subjective interpretation.
Inherent in such subjectivity is the potential for arbitrary and discre-
tionary police power. The crucial point is that the objective standard
fosters arbitrary police power-the very consequence the standard
was intended to prevent.10
A definite time period eliminates a significant portion of this "ar-
bitrariness" by leaving fewer decisions to the discretion of the officer.
Inevitably, the set time period will not encompass every possible fac-
tual situation. However, a rationally set period will be more than suf-
ficient to cover an overwhelming majority of cases.' The rare case
206. In United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974), the police stopped
an airplane and ordered the passengers to disembark. The court held the actions to
be valid since further investigation was warranted. When the defendants did not answer
legitimate police inquiries, a detention of an hour was not unreasonable.
207. In United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1980), defendant
was legally stopped, pursuant to informer's tip. But a three hour detention was so
similar to an arrest that it could only be justified on probable cause.
208. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 867 (1974).
Upon warrants charging mail fraud violations, federal agents searched defendant's apart-
ment for five hours.
209. State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1978). Upon the execution of a search
warrant for blood stains, the court found a three day search of a house was not
reasonable.
210. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
211. Pilcher, Law and Practice in Field Inte-rrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.,
465, 488 (1967). On the basis of about three hundred field interrogations in Chicago,
it was reported that the average length of time a citizen was detained by a field stop
was between two and three minutes. One person was detained about twenty minutes
until the victim of an armed robbery arrived and made negative identification. One
driver was detained more than forty-five minutes while a check was being made. This
delay occurred on a Friday night while there was a computer malfunction; the person
was arrested when it was reported that his driver's license had been revoked. Other
than these two instances, a detention did not last over five or six minutes minutes
and, of course, the overwhelming majority were much less than that.
In a second test, one-half of the suspects were detained less than ten minutes,
while three-fourths of the total were detained less than twenty minutes. Nevertheless,
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that is impaired by a set time period will be more than adequately
balanced by the overall increase in personal privacy and the elimina-
tion of situations where an innocent person is wrongfully detained
for an extended period.
Without definite guidelines, the occupants in Summers will be
forced to surrender their constitutional rights indefinitely. They will
lose their right of privacy, their right of liberty, and their right to
freedom of movement for as long as it takes the officers to search
the house. All of this imposition will occur regardless of their in-
nocence, or "presumed innocence."2"' Opponents of the definite stan-
dard overlook this argument by insisting that a "reasonableness" stan-
dard gives police necessary discretion in detecting and preventing
crime.21 However, studies have shown that the length of the deten-
tion, no matter how long it lasts, will add vary little to the conviction
rate of criminals.214 Personal privacy rights are fundamentally
guaranteed by the Constitution and must remain of utmost impor-
tance. A definite time standard fosters the protection of these fun-
five percent were detained for an hour or more before the decision to book or release
them was made. It should be noted that these times included instances of questioning
on the way to the station and upon arrival. LaFave, "Street Encounters", supra note
57, at 98 n.307, citing Reiss and Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374
ANNALS 47, 52 (1967).
212. A premise of our legal system is that a man is "innocent until proven
guilty."
213. See supra note 196.
214. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department was allowed to
arrest suspects for investigation and then interrogate them to determine guilt. The
Department argued that without this procedure police effectiveness would be severely
impaired. The value of the practice was studied by the Commissioner's Committee
on Police Arrests for Investigation, in 1961 and 1962. The results were published in
the Horsky Report.
The study found that of 1,356 suspects held over eight hours, only sixteen (1.2%)
were charged. The others were released without any charge after eight hours or more
of detention. Of the 690 suspects held over twelve hours, only seven (1%) were charged
Again, the remainder were released after this prolonged detention without any charge.
A statistical breakdown of some of the specific crimes over a two year period reveals
that:
211 were arrested for investigation of homicide, only 1 was charged;
120 were arrested for investigation of rape, only 3 were charged;
1,998 were arrested for investigation of robbery, only 51 were charged;
1,682 were arrested for investigation of house-breaking, only 67 were
charged.
It is fairly obvious that even with detentions as long as twelve hours, the conviction
rate is only affected minimally. Report and Recommendation of the Commissioner's Com-
mittee on Police Arrests for Investigation (1962), cited in Pye, Supreme Court and the
Police: Fact and Fiction, 57 J. CRIM. L., & P.S. 404, 408 (1966).
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damental rights. A "reasonableness" standard, on the other hand,
fosters arbitrary police power under the guise of increased crime
prevention. But increased crime prevention is a policy consideration,
not a constitutional inquiry. Thus, even assuming that a reasonableness
standard can substantially promote the crime prevention interest, this
policy argument nevertheless cannot pre-empt the explicit constitu-
tional guarantees of personal privacy. Thus, for the sake of personal
privacy, liberty and autonomy, definite time standards must be
established.
Every detention statute should express a maximum length of
detention. It is not essential that every state have the same time limit.
The importance is that the statute is concrete enough to give the
officer definite guidelines. The statute must balance the need for crime
prevention against the individual's personal rights. A thirty minute
limit would probably be the most appropriate for maximizing the
suspect's privacy rights while still allowing sufficient time for
investigation.
Thirty minutes is sufficient to cover the overwhelming majority
of situations in which a detention is necessary. Thirty minutes is more
than sufficient time to obtain the suspect's identification and to deter-
mine whether the suspect can exonerate himself. It also allows ample
time to check the identification and the suspect's explanation of his
actions. In addition, the existence of a thirty minute time limit would
clearly indicate to the officer that the statute is designed to permit
only the most minor detentions. It could not be construed as a tacit
authorization to take the person into custody while further investiga-
tion is in progress.
Anything longer than thirty minutes is hard to reconcile with
the "briefness" requirement of a stop. Since the word "brief" is too
vague to be used as a standard, a specific time will define "brief'
and give the officer a definite understanding of how long he may hold
a suspect. A thirty minute time limit would also eliminate a prolonged
detention occasioned by police abuse. If an officer decided to hold the
suspect for the full time allotted by the statute, the resulting one-
half hour detention would still be a relatively minor invasion of one's
right to free movement and freedom from unreasonable intrusions.
Thus, a thirty minute time limit allows ample time for investigation
while minimizing the instrusions on personal privacy.
The privacy rights involved in a Summers-type detention are as
constitutionally viable as the rights triggered in an investigatory stop.
In fact, the analogous nature of the Summers' detention and the Terry
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stop suggests that the same balance of order and freedom is involved
in both situations-the right to detain suspects for investigations as
oppposed to the suspects' rights of privacy, liberty and the right to
be free from "unreasonable seizures." Thus, the standards applicable
to Terry are applicable to Summers. It is recognized that in a Sum-
mers' situation thirty minutes may not be sufficient to search a house.
But, the time limit would be set merely to protect the privacy rights
of the occupants, not to curtail the search of the premises. Once the
thirty minute time limit is reached, the occupants must be arrested
or released, but a reasonable search of the premises may continue.
Thus, while thirty minutes may not be sufficient to search a house,
it is sufficient time to question the occupants of that dwelling and
to permit them to exonerate themselves. A thirty minute standard
will eliminate the inequities fostered by an objective standard.
Moreover, a thirty minute standard will help preserve established and
time-honored fourth amendment principles.
Conclusion
The fourth amendment is premised on the need to protect per-
sonal privacy and liberty. Prior to the fourth amendment, general war-
rants and writs of assistance giving the executing officer virtually
unlimited discretion were prevalent. To combat this unlimited discre-
tion and arbitrariness and the ensuing intrusions upon personal
privacy, the fourth amendment requires a showing of probable cause
before the issuance of any warrant. A warrant to search a location
for contraband must be based upon probable cause that the contra-
band is located on the premises. Summers suggests that this probable
cause also authorizes the detention of the occupants of those premises.
But a search warrant is only based upon the location of the contra-
band. It is not based upon probable cause to believe that the occupants
are engaged in illegal activities or are necessarily connected with the
named contraband. Thus, a search warrant which does not mention
or describe a particular person should not authorize a detention and
subsequent arrest of that person.
The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the probable
cause requirement-the investigatory stop. The elements of an in-
vestigatory stop are clearly enunciated in case law. The stop must
be based upon reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed
and that the suspect has some connection with the criminal activity.
Secondly, the questioning pursuant to a stop must be limited to in-
quiries designed to allay the officer's suspicion concerning the suspect.
Finally, for the past thirteen years, the Supreme Court, has held
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"briefness" to be the standard for determining the duration of a stop.
The Supreme Court obviously felt that a definite time standard was
unnecessary since the stop could be adequately supervised by the
courts to insure fourth amendment privacy rights. Thus, the Court
has never set a definite time standard for this limited exception to
the probable cause requirement. But judicial times have changed. This
one limited exception is being used as a stepping stone for new prob-
able cause exceptions with far-reaching ramifications. If the Court is
to stop this "stepping-stone" syndrome and its potential onslaught of
the probable cause requirement, it must start while probable cause
is still the rule. It cannot wait until numerous exceptions change the
rule itself into an "exception."
Any exception to, or modification of, probable cause as is related
to detentions must start with Terry, because Terry was the first such
recognized exception to the probable cause requirement. Thus, stan-
dards established in Terry would be applicable to modifications cover-
ing the same subject matter. If definite time limits were set on the
detention aspect of a Terry stop, future modifications regarding the
duration of any detention, as in Summers, should be required to follow
Terry. This is not to suggest that every detention statute must be
identical but the underlying standard should be comparable. The
statute must balance the opposing interests of order and freedom;
justifying any detention upon some particularized interest apart from
the general police interest in discovering evidence and apprehending
wrongdoers. The statute must also precisely state the requirements
for a detention in order to furnish fair guidelines for police and
citizens, to promote consistency in judicial interpretation, and to avoid
the unnecessary relinquishment of personal privacy and liberty rights.
To insure the continuity of the fourth amendment's time-honored
balance of order and freedom, the Supreme Court or the legislature
must re-examine the Summers' decisiQn. The decision as written is
too vague to provide its own guidelines and consequently will not
safeguard the protections of the fourth amendment. Definite standards
must be set as to the duration of the detention, the definition of "oc-
cupant", and the proximity of the occupant to the premises. The in-
nate distinctions between search warrants and arrest warrants must
also be restored. Moreover, these distinctions must be re-established
before the potential ramifications of prolonged detentions and
unauthorized searches become reality and the fourth amendment pro-
tections of personal liberty and privacy mere verbiage.
Steve Holwerda
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